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Is intelligence determined by genetic factors? Questions such as this
are regularly being debated, a recent example having been an article
by Toby Young on what schools can be expected to achieve in light of
scientific evidence on cognitive ability. Leon Feinstein explains what
science actually says, and, most importantly, what it doesn’t say about
heritability.
In October 2017 Teach First published a blog stating that genes place very substantial
limitations on the role of schools. The blog was pulled the next day. The author was Toby
Young, one of the leading figures in the Free Schools movement, and the piece
concerned the “limits to what schools can achieve.” Young asserts that “it is naïve to
think schools can do much to ameliorate the effects of inequality. I don’t just mean socio-
economic inequality; I also mean differences in intelligence.”
This is a remarkable and strong statement but in Young’s view it is robust, pure science. I
can’t speak for Teach First – or indeed for the BBC who put on air an earlier version of
the hypothesis – but my disagreement is not about what I would like to be true: it is about
what science might allow us to infer. Still, Young’s view is prevalent amongst policy
makers and academics so it is a useful and important debate to have.
I shall try to explain here why I think Young’s interpretation of the science is overblown
and mangled at best. I write as a social scientist, not a geneticist or biologist. I draw
heavily on work conducted by Rachel Latham at the Early Intervention Foundation, who
looked at what we have learnt from twin studies in inferring genetic influences to an array
of features of developmental interest.
Heritability: the scientific evidence
Heritability represents an estimate of the degree of variation in a “trait” (e.g.
“intelligence”) in a population that is statistically explained by genetic variation between
individuals. Twin studies use the fact that identical twins are more genetically related than
non-identical twins, to attribute to genetic as opposed to “environmental” factors the
greater similarity in a trait they posses. However, findings rest on a number of complex
statistical assumptions that collectively preclude conclusions regarding genetic causation
of individual differences (relative to environmental influences, and the interplay between
the two) in a given phenotype.
This important point is underscored by differences in the magnitude of heritability
estimates using twin studies relative to more recent molecular genetic studies.
Complementary evidence, using novel research designs where children have been
adopted at birth or conceived through assisted reproductive technologies (thereby
children and rearing parents are not genetically related) presents compelling evidence as
1/3
to the influence of home and school environment. The jury is very much out as to the role
of genetic factors as causative agents to outcomes, including intelligence, when
examined across an array of different research designs. (The above is obviously a
summary, so I recommend the EIF website as a basic resource for more information.)
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Heritability: what isn’t science
Clearly, evidence relating to genetic effects in complex traits (such as intelligence) is less
than straightforward, so we should be careful in handling ideas about its relationship to
complex concepts like inequality or schools.
Here I want to set out three basic and fundamental weaknesses of Young’s handling of
such material. Others will point to other flaws. On the BBC Young made more of the idea
that the transmission of poverty and wealth across generations, our social structure, is
pre-determined, genetic and innate, transmitted with stability across generations. For
Teach First he emphasised more the supposed non-malleability of intelligence, asserting
that “the impact of the environment on children’s attainment… is fairly negligible.” So
schools don’t matter much. Both of these sets of arguments on structural inequality and
a fixed IQ are based on Young’s interpretation of “heritability” estimated from twin
studies.
The first problem is the relation drawn from genes to individuals to social groups. Twin
studies data provide information about the variations between individuals in a population.
They do not tell us about social groups, such as the poor or the rich. Nor does twin data
tell us about individuals; nothing in such studies indicates that anything can be said
about the genome of a child from knowledge of that child’s family’s social status. It is
hugely important that teachers know that there is nothing in science which enables them
to read anything about the innate attributes of a child from knowing about the social class
or income of the child’s parents – nothing at all.
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Secondly, it is wrong to imagine that the heritable component from a statistical
decomposition of population variance inferred from a twin study means that genes ever
act separately from the physical, social, and economic environments of DNA in the reality
of human lives. The biological sciences have clearly moved beyond the opposition of
genes and environment in the mind of Galton to appreciate and start to understand how
genes and environments interact in multiple and complex ways. Environmental forces
nearly always matter. A heritability estimate does not express a pure causal force, that
over time and across generations slowly comes to dominate social relations, nor does it
suggest at all that schools should give up the candle.
A third problem for the structural inequality argument is that twin study heritability data tell
us only about cross-sectional relations in terms of the long chain of intergenerational
relations that underpin either social history or evolution; they are not an estimate of an
intergenerational relationship. Heritability only seeks to measure the extra similarities of
characteristic associated with extra commonality of genome within a generation, it
doesn’t measure the actual degree of transfer of a characteristic across generations, nor
how that changes over time. But, epigenetic studies are beginning to inform this process,
and show a clear role for the ‘environment’ in shaping gene expression. So, twin data is
an inadequate basis for a supposed social theory about class and income over time.
I have no objection to Young posing the notion that there are limits to what schools can
achieve – that’s clearly true, the quality of education reform being one limiting factor – but
I do object to his assertion that he is offering an unquestionable and scientific view.
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